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BREACH OF AGREEMENT VERSUS VEXATIOUS, 
OPPRESSIVE AND UNCONSCIONABLE CONDUCT 
Clarifying their Relationship in the Law of  
Anti-Suit Injunctions 
Cases warranting the grant of an anti-suit injunction can be 
divided into three main categories: breach of agreement, 
vexatious, oppressive, or unconscionable conduct, and abuse 
of process. A series of Singapore cases have demonstrated that 
the boundaries between the first two categories are ambiguous 
in Singapore law. This ambiguity reflects a lack of clarity about 
the principles underlying anti-suit injunctions and creates 
uncertainty as to the applicable analysis for each category. This 
article argues that the two categories should be distinct in 
kind, with both categories remaining part of the court’s 
equitable jurisdiction. Such an approach will provide a good 
foundation in principle for the applicable rules of law and 
provide a principled foundation for the “strong reasons” 
standard. 
CHNG Wei Yao Kenny* 
LLB (Summa Cum Laude) (Singapore Management University); 
Naval Officer, Republic of Singapore Navy. 
I. Introduction 
1 Anti-suit injunctions are an important feature of private 
international law. When faced with an application for an anti-suit 
injunction, the fundamental principles that govern the Singapore court’s 
decision are well settled.1 These principles were set out in the dicta of the 
Privy Council’s decision in Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v 
Lee Kui Jak2 (“Société Nationale”), which were also accepted in Singapore 
in Evergreen International SA v Volkswagen Group Singapore Pte Ltd3 
(“Evergreen International SA”). 
                                                          
* The author is grateful to Assistant Professor Yip Man of the School of Law, 
Singapore Management University, for her very helpful comments and suggestions. 
Any mistakes or omissions in this article are the author’s own. 
1 Regalindo Resources Pte Ltd v Seatrek Trans Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR(R) 930 at [12]; 
VH v VI [2008] 1 SLR(R) 742 at [37]. 
2 [1987] AC 871. 
3 [2004] 2 SLR(R) 457. 
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2 Cases warranting the grant of an anti-suit injunction can be 
divided into three main categories. The first category of cases involves the 
breach of an agreement. Where there is such a breach, the court will be 
inclined to enforce the agreement. The party in breach has to show 
“strong reasons” as to why the court should allow his breach of the 
agreement.4 The second category of cases bases the grant of an anti-suit 
injunction on the vexatious, oppressive or unconscionable conduct of the 
defendant. In such cases, the party seeking an anti-suit injunction must 
show the vexatious, oppressive or unconscionable conduct of the other 
party in commencing foreign proceedings. The third category of cases 
justifies the grant of an anti-suit injunction on the prevention of abuse of 
process and protection of the court’s jurisdiction. 
3 A series of Singapore cases have demonstrated that the 
boundaries between the first two categories are ambiguous in Singapore 
law. At times, the courts suggest that breach of an agreement is mere 
evidence of vexatious and oppressive conduct. At other times, they affirm 
that breach of an agreement is an independent ground for the grant of an 
anti-suit injunction. This ambiguity regarding the boundaries between 
the categories is undesirable – it reflects a lack of clarity about the 
principles underlying anti-suit injunctions, and creates uncertainty as to 
the applicable analysis for each category. This article argues that the 
category of vexatious, oppressive, and unconscionable conduct should be 
distinct in kind from the category of breach of agreement, with both 
categories remaining part of the court’s equitable jurisdiction. Such an 
approach will provide a good foundation in principle for the applicable 
rules of law, and will prevent confusion as to when the “strong reasons” 
standard will apply. 
4 This article will first elucidate the principles underlying the grant 
of anti-suit injunctions with a view to clarifying the relationship between 
them. Second, it will critique a series of contemporary Singaporean cases 
that have developed the law with regard to the boundaries between the 
two categories. Third, this article will propose three approaches for 
formulating the boundaries between the two categories, consider the 
implications of each approach, and recommend a way ahead for the 
development of the law. 
                                                          
4 Donohue v Armco Inc [2001] UKHL 64; [2002] 1 All ER 749 at [24]; Channel Tunnel 
Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1993] AC 334 at 342; CSR Ltd v Cigna 
Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345 at 392. 
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II. Principles underlying the grant of anti-suit injunctions 
5 This part will highlight the key principles underlying the grant of 
an anti-suit injunction, as articulated by commentators and judges across 
the common law jurisdictions.5 
A. Equity 
6 At the most fundamental level, anti-suit injunctions are 
grounded in equity. This equitable foundation can be attributed to the 
origin of the remedy in the English Court of Chancery’s equitable 
jurisdiction. The ancestor of the anti-suit injunction was the “common 
injunction”, developed in the 15th century to prevent a party from suing 
in English common law courts if such action was against good 
conscience.6 The reach of these injunctions eventually extended beyond 
English shores to proceedings in foreign countries also, resulting in the 
anti-suit injunction we are familiar with today.7 This foundation in equity 
generally means that considerations of natural justice, unconscionability 
and inequitable conduct are key to justifying the grant of an anti-suit 
injunction. As stated by Lord Goff in Société Nationale, the courts will 
exercise their jurisdiction to grant anti-suit injunctions only when the 
ends of justice require.8 
7 The equitable nature of the remedy lends itself against the 
formulation of fixed categories dictating when the court will intervene.9 
This sentiment has been echoed by both the Australian and US courts.10 
                                                          
5 Although the subsequent parts of this article will consider English law, it should be 
noted that the UK is now part of the European Union. Its principles on the grant of 
anti-suit injunctions to restrain proceedings in EU Member States may thus be 
modified by the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968 and the European Court of 
Justice. Nevertheless, pre-Brussels Convention cases, such as Société Nationale 
Industrielle Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871, remain persuasive authority 
in Singapore. The impact of the Brussels Convention on the English law on anti-suit 
injunctions is discussed later at para 22 below. 
6 Trevor C Hartley, “Comity and the Use of Anti-suit Injunctions in International 
Litigation” (1987) 35(3) American Journal of Comparative Law 487 at 489; today, the 
Singapore court’s injunctive jurisdiction can be found in s 4(10) of the Civil Law Act 
(Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed). 
7 Trevor C Hartley, “Comity and the Use of Anti-suit Injunctions in International 
Litigation” (1987) 35(3) American Journal of Comparative Law 487 at 490. 
8 Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871 at 892. 
9 Clare Ambrose, “Can Anti-Suit Injunctions Survive European Community Law?” 
(2003) 52(2) ICLQ 401 at 404. 
10 Jonathan R C Arkins, “Borderline Legal: Anti-Suit Injunctions in Common Law 
Jurisdictions” (2001) 18(6) Journal of International Arbitration 603 at 605 and 612; 
Laker Airways Ltd v Sabena, Belgian World Airlines (1984) 731 F 2d 909 at 926; CSR 
Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd [1997] HCA 33. 
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Nevertheless, for clarity of analysis, judges and commentators alike have 
sought to identify categories of cases which warrant the grant of an  
anti-suit injunction. A survey of the case law and commentary across the 
common law jurisdictions reveals three main categories: vexatious, 
oppressive or unconscionable conduct, breach of agreement, and abuse of 
process or protection of the court’s jurisdiction. The third category is 
distinct from the first two.11 As described by the Australian High Court,12 
the first two categories of cases are founded in the court’s equitable 
jurisdiction. In contrast, the third category is founded upon the court’s 
inherent jurisdiction to prevent its own processes from being used 
unjustly and to protect the integrity of its own processes.13 In view of the 
issue being discussed, the focus of this article will be on the relationship 
between the first two categories of cases. 
(1) Vexatious, oppressive or unconscionable conduct 
8 The first category is where the defendant has acted in a vexatious, 
oppressive or unconscionable manner in his commencement of 
proceedings in a foreign court, in view of the local court being the natural 
forum.14 A typical scenario illustrating this category of cases is where B 
brings proceedings in Jurisdiction X against A, and A seeks an anti-suit 
injunction in the local forum against B’s proceedings in Jurisdiction X 
due to B’s vexatious, oppressive or unconscionable conduct. 
9 To determine whether an anti-suit injunction should be granted 
in this category of cases, the English courts will consider the vexation and 
oppression of the foreign proceedings to the plaintiffs and injustice to the 
defendant if he is deprived of advantages in the foreign forum.15 
                                                          
11 Yeo Tiong Min, “The Effective Reach of In Personam Reasoning in Private 
International Law”, Yong Pung How Professorship of Law Lecture (2009) at para 16. 
An example of such a situation would be in bankruptcy proceedings. If insolvency 
proceedings have commenced in a local forum, a party may initiate proceedings in 
a foreign court to obtain the benefit of foreign assets. In such a situation, the local 
forum may grant an anti-suit injunction against the party initiating foreign 
proceedings in order to protect the local insolvency proceedings: see Manharlal 
Trikamdas Mody v Sumikin Bussan International (HK) Ltd [2014] SGHC 123 
at [110] and Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871 
at 892–893. 
12 CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd [1997] HCA 33. 
13 CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd [1997] HCA 33; Lee Suet Lin Joyce, 
“An Injunction on Anti-suit Injunctions? CSR Limited v Cigna Insurance Australia 
Limited & Ors” (1998) 20 Asia Business Law Review 48 at 49. 
14 Yeo Tiong Min, “The Effective Reach of In Personam Reasoning in Private 
International Law”, Yong Pung How Professorship of Law Lecture (2009) at para 16; 
Clare Ambrose, “Can Anti-Suit Injunctions Survive European Community Law?” 
(2003) 52(2) ICLQ 401 at 404. 
15 Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871 at 896. 
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Singapore law broadly follows English law in this regard.16 The analogous 
stage of the Canadian court’s analysis, as stated in Amchem Products Inc v 
British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board),17 is largely similar to 
English law as well.18 In Australia, the Australian High Court in CSR Ltd v 
Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd19 also applied the Société Nationale test, but 
focused on the unconscionability of the plaintiff ’s conduct in bringing the 
foreign proceedings. 
10 What amounts to vexatious, oppressive or unconscionable 
conduct cannot be and should not be defined exhaustively – rather, it 
depends on the facts of each case.20 Some situations where the courts have 
found such conduct involved a party bringing proceedings in bad faith 
with intention to harass, bringing proceedings that are bound to fail or 
are brought to achieve illegitimate purpose, causing extreme 
inconvenience through the foreign proceedings, and subjecting the other 
party to oppressive procedures in the foreign court.21 
(2) Breach of agreement 
11 The second category is where the court acts to prevent the breach 
of an agreement by granting an anti-suit injunction. Three different types 
of agreements will be discussed under this category. 
12 The first type of agreement, which forms the main bulk of cases 
in this category, is a jurisdiction agreement.22 A typical scenario in this 
category of cases would be where A sues B in Jurisdiction X, in breach of 
a jurisdiction agreement in favour of the local forum.23 B then seeks an 
                                                          
16 Evergreen International SA v Volkswagen Group Singapore Pte Ltd [2004] 
2 SLR(R) 457 at [16]; John Reginald Stott Kirkham v Trane US Inc [2009] 4 SLR(R) 428 
at [27]. 
17 [1993] 150 NR 321. 
18 J P McEvoy, “International Litigation: Canada, Forum Non Conveniens and the  
Anti-Suit Injunction” (1995) 17(1) Advocates’ Quarterly 1; Amchem Products Inc v 
British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) [1993] 150 NR 321 at 360. 
19 [1997] HCA 33. 
20 Hong Hin Kay Albert v AAHG, LLC [2014] SGHC 206 at [48]; Société Nationale 
Industrielle Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871 at 893; CSR Ltd v Cigna 
Insurance Australia Ltd [1997] HCA 33. 
21 Rory Butler & Baptiste Weijburg, “Do Anti-Suit Injunctions Still Have a Role to 
Play? – An English Law Perspective” (2011–2012) 24 USF Maritime Law Journal 257 
at 284; John Reginald Stott Kirkham v Trane US Inc [2009] 4 SLR(R) 428 at [47]. 
22 Yeo Tiong Min, “The Effective Reach of In Personam Reasoning in Private 
International Law”, Yong Pung How Professorship of Law Lecture (2009) at para 16. 
23 Third court situations are also possible, but less typical. Such situations occur where 
A sues B in Jurisdiction X in breach of a jurisdiction agreement in favour of Y. 
B seeks an anti-suit injunction against A in the local forum. In such cases, the 
Singapore court has held that it will not act as an “international busybody” (People’s 
Insurance Co Ltd v Akai Pty Ltd [1997] 2 SLR(R) 291 at [12]). 
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anti-suit injunction in the local forum against A’s proceedings in 
Jurisdiction X. 
13 At this point, a distinction must be drawn between exclusive and 
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements. The intention expressed by each 
of these agreements is different. A non-exclusive jurisdiction clause 
evinces an intention of the parties to confer jurisdiction on one or more 
courts. An exclusive jurisdiction clause, on top of an intention to confer 
such jurisdiction, also includes an agreement not to bring proceedings to 
any other courts. 
14 In Singapore law, the lines are blurred with respect to the 
intention evinced by each jurisdiction clause.24 The classification of each 
clause as non-exclusive or exclusive is an exercise in contractual 
construction, whether it is exclusive or non-exclusive on its face.25 
A jurisdiction clause that appears to be non-exclusive on its face can be 
interpreted as carrying with it intentions similar to that of an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause, if an analysis of contractual intention points in that 
direction.26 Should this be the case, the non-exclusive jurisdiction clause 
will be treated, for all intents and purposes, as an exclusive jurisdiction 
clause. Similarly, as was held in Abdul Rashid bin Abdul Manaf v Hii Yii 
Ann27 (“Abdul Rashid”), a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause can be 
construed as a “most appropriate jurisdiction clause”, should the context 
point in that direction.28 Such a clause would effectively have the same 
effect as an exclusive jurisdiction clause.29 A non-exclusive jurisdiction 
clause can also be construed as having the effect of an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause upon the satisfaction of certain conditions. This was 
the case in Sabah Shipyard (Pakistan) Ltd v Islamic Republic of Pakistan30 
(“Sabah Shipyard”), where a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause was 
construed as having the same effect as an exclusive jurisdiction clause 
once proceedings were commenced in England, the chosen jurisdiction. 
                                                          
24 Orchard Capital I Ltd v Ravindra Kumar Jhunjhunwala [2012] 2 SLR 519 at [24] and 
[30]–[31], citing Yeo Tiong Min, “The Contractual Basis of the Enforcement of 
Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements” (2005) 17 SAcLJ 306 
at 359. 
25 Orchard Capital I Ltd v Ravindra Kumar Jhunjhunwala [2012] 2 SLR 519 at [24]; 
Yeo Tiong Min, “The Contractual Basis of the Enforcement of Exclusive and  
Non-Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements” (2005) 17 SAcLJ 306 at 359. 
26 Orchard Capital I Ltd v Ravindra Kumar Jhunjhunwala [2012] 2 SLR 519 at [24]; 
Yeo Tiong Min, “The Contractual Basis of the Enforcement of Exclusive and  
Non-Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements” (2005) 17 SAcLJ 306 at 359. 
27 [2014] 4 SLR 1042. 
28 Abdul Rashid bin Abdul Manaf v Hii Yii Ann [2014] 4 SLR 1042 at [53]. 
29 Abdul Rashid bin Abdul Manaf v Hii Yii Ann [2014] 4 SLR 1042 at [54]. 
30 [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 571. 
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15 Despite the presently blurred boundaries between non-exclusive 
and exclusive jurisdiction agreements, it is worth noting that the 
Singapore High Court in Abdul Rashid expressed an unwillingness to read 
too much into a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement and was keen to 
adhere to the ordinary meaning of the agreement, for the purpose of 
ensuring commercial certainty regarding the effect of jurisdiction 
agreements.31 This decision may be viewed as a signal that although a 
contractual analysis of jurisdiction agreements is possible in Singapore 
law, as highlighted by the Singapore Court of Appeal in Orchard Capital 
I Ltd v Ravindra Kumar Jhunjhunwala32 (“Orchard Capital”),33 the courts 
will be wary of going beyond the ordinary meaning of jurisdiction 
agreements. 
16 With respect to the consequences of classifying each clause as one 
or the other, the lines are clear. Since a non-exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement does not include a promise not to commence proceedings in a 
non-chosen forum, commencing proceedings in a non-chosen forum will 
not amount to a breach of the agreement. The legal analysis will thus be 
substantially the same as in the first category of cases. However, the 
existence of a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause will remain significant as 
a factor in a natural forum analysis and also to determine if the foreign 
proceedings were brought in a vexatious, oppressive or unconscionable 
manner.34 The strength of the clause as an indicator of natural forum or 
unconscionable conduct depends on the circumstances.35 As noted in 
Orchard Capital, in certain situations, the non-exclusive jurisdiction 
clause may have such a strong impact on the natural forum and vexatious 
conduct analysis that its practical effect can be similar to that of an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause, although the two types of clauses remain 
conceptually distinct.36 
17 Where the effect of the jurisdiction clause is exclusive, 
proceedings commenced in a non-chosen forum will amount to a breach 
of the agreement. In such cases, the courts have applied a different 
analysis. In English law, where there is an exclusive jurisdiction clause, 
and there is a claim falling within its scope being pursued in a non-chosen 
forum, the English court will ordinarily exercise its jurisdiction to grant 
                                                          
31 Abdul Rashid bin Abdul Manaf v Hii Yii Ann [2014] 4 SLR 1042 at [54]. 
32 [2012] 2 SLR 519. 
33 Orchard Capital I Ltd v Ravindra Kumar Jhunjhunwala [2012] 2 SLR 519 at [24]. 
34 Christopher J S Knight, “Anti-Suit Injunctions and Non-Exclusive Jurisdiction 
Clauses” (2010) 69 Cambridge Law Journal 25 at 26. 
35 Yeo Tiong Min, “The Contractual Basis of the Enforcement of Exclusive and  
Non-Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements” (2005) 17 SAcLJ 306 at 356; Orchard 
Capital I Ltd v Ravindra Kumar Jhunjhunwala [2012] 2 SLR 519 at [30]. The context 
of the judgment is a natural forum analysis during a stay of proceedings exercise, but 
similar principles should apply to the anti-suit injunction context as well. 
36 Orchard Capital I Ltd v Ravindra Kumar Jhunjhunwala [2012] 2 SLR 519 at [31]. 
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an anti-suit injunction unless the party suing in the non-chosen forum 
can show strong reasons for being allowed to breach the agreement.37 The 
same test applies in Singapore law as well.38 The effect of the exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement lies in shifting the burden of proof to the party in 
breach.39 To illustrate, considering the typical scenario described earlier, 
B would be granted the anti-suit injunction almost as a matter of course, 
unless A is able to discharge the burden of proof on him to show strong 
reasons for allowing his breach of the jurisdiction agreement. In contrast, 
without a breach of agreement, B would have the burden of proving A’s 
vexatious, oppressive or unconscionable conduct. This effect applies 
whether a stay of proceedings or anti-suit injunction is sought. 
18 The second type of agreement that can be considered in this 
category is a settlement agreement. A settlement agreement typically 
provides for full and final settlement of any claims between the parties, 
and includes a promise between the parties not to bring any further 
claims against each other. A hypothetical scenario will illustrate the 
relationship between settlement agreements and anti-suit injunctions. 
A and B have entered into a settlement agreement providing for full and 
final settlement of any claims between them, including an agreement not 
to pursue any further claims against each other. A subsequently 
commences proceedings against B in Jurisdiction X. In this scenario, 
there are three options open to B. First, B can apply for a stay of 
proceedings in X for breach of the settlement agreement.40 Second, B can 
commence proceedings in Jurisdiction Y against A, obtain a judgment on 
the merits of the case that there is indeed a breach of the settlement 
agreement, and apply for a permanent anti-suit injunction to “uphold and 
enforce the judgment given in the action”.41 This is contingent on A 
submitting to the jurisdiction of Y’s courts. This option describes the 
situation that took place in Ashlock William Grover v SetClear Pte Ltd42 
(“Ashlock v SetClear”). Third, B could commence proceedings in Y 
against A, and apply for an interlocutory anti-suit injunction for breach 
of the settlement agreement, invoking the same principles applicable to 
cases of breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. Commentators 
                                                          
37 Donohue v Armco Inc [2001] UKHL 64; [2002] 1 All ER 749 at [24]; The Eleftheria 
[1970] P 94 at 99–100; Rory Butler & Baptiste Weijburg, “Do Anti-Suit Injunctions 
Still Have a Role to Play? – An English Law Perspective” (2011–2012) 24 USF 
Maritime Law Journal 257 at 270–272; Daniel Tan, “No Dispute Amounting to 
Strong Cause; Strong Cause for Dispute?” (2001) 13 SAcLJ 428. 
38 The Jian He [2000] 1 SLR 8 at [33]; Vincent Leow, “Exclusively Here to Stay: The 
Applicable Principles to Granting a Stay on the Basis of an Exclusive Jurisdiction 
Clause” (2004) Sing JLS 569 at 571. 
39 Daniel Tan, “No Dispute Amounting to Strong Cause; Strong Cause for Dispute?” 
(2001) 13 SAcLJ 428 at 437. 
40 Ashlock William Grover v SetClear Pte Ltd [2012] 2 SLR 625 at [26]. 
41 Ashlock William Grover v SetClear Pte Ltd [2012] 2 SLR 625 at [28]. 
42 [2012] 2 SLR 625. 
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have argued that the breach of a settlement agreement should provide 
sufficient grounds for the grant of an anti-suit injunction even if there is 
no breach of a jurisdiction agreement.43 It is suggested that this option is 
possible in principle, despite the lack of supporting authority, since a 
settlement agreement can be viewed as conceptually similar to an 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement, except that the derogation effect of a 
settlement agreement applies to all jurisdictions and not just the  
non-chosen ones.44 
19 The third type of agreement is a choice of law agreement. It may 
be argued that a choice of law agreement implies an agreement that 
parties will only commence proceedings in a jurisdiction which will be 
expected to apply the chosen law.45 Viewed thus, the agreement can be 
breached if a party brings proceedings before a jurisdiction which will not 
apply the chosen law, justifying the grant of an anti-suit injunction. Such 
an argument was put forth in Ace Insurance Ltd v Moose Enterprise Pty 
Ltd46 (“Ace Insurance”), where the defendant argued that the plaintiff had 
breached the express choice of Australian law clause by bringing 
proceedings in California, which would apply Californian law. The New 
South Wales Supreme Court dealt with the issue by holding that a choice 
of law clause does not carry with it an implied obligation not to invoke 
the jurisdiction of a court which would not apply the chosen law – choice 
of law clauses are generally declaratory of the parties’ intention, and not 
promissory in effect.47 Without promissory effect, a choice of law clause 
cannot be breached, and thus cannot be a ground for the grant of an anti-
suit injunction. However, the Supreme Court did not preclude the 
possibility of a choice of law clause having promissory effect, if it was 
drafted in very clear language. In any case, the Supreme Court found that 
even if the choice of law clause in the case before them was promissory in 
nature, it would not have been breached since the Californian court 
would have applied Australian law. The position of the English and 
Singapore courts on the availability of an anti-suit injunction for breach 
of a choice of law clause remains to be seen, although it is suggested that 
the openness of the Singapore Court of Appeal to conducting a 
                                                          
43 James J Fawcett & Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2011) at para 6.269. 
44 As described in Yeo Tiong Min, “The Contractual Basis of the Enforcement of 
Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements” (2005) 17 SAcLJ 306 
at 312–313, para 12, prorogation is the function of providing the legal justification 
for the chosen court to hear the case, while derogation is the function of supplying 
reasons for not having the case decided in a court which the parties do not want to 
hear the case. 
45 Adrian Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2008) at para 11.52, cited in Ace Insurance Ltd v Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd 
[2009] NSWSC 724 at [44]. 
46 [2009] NSWSC 724. 
47 Ace Insurance Ltd v Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 724 at [51]. 
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contractual analysis of jurisdiction agreements48 may be perceived as an 
indication that the Singapore courts will be willing to do the same for 
choice of law clauses as well. 
20 Commentators have observed that the line between the 
categories of vexatious, oppressive or unconscionable conduct and breach 
of agreement is not clear – some judges consider the categories distinct, 
while others appear to combine the two under the broader category of 
unconscionability.49 Some English cases apply the language of vexatious 
and oppressive conduct when granting anti-suit injunctions in cases 
where there is breach of an agreement.50 The courts in these cases appear 
to have viewed breach of the agreement as evidence of vexatious and 
oppressive conduct. Part III51 of this article will consider a series of 
Singapore cases that have touched on the relationship between the two 
categories to determine if the same ambiguity exists in Singapore law. 
However, before we proceed to do so, we must consider the principle of 
comity. 
B. Comity 
21 Comity is a principle underlying much of the law relating to  
anti-suit injunctions.52 It has been famously defined in Hilton v Guyot53 
by the US Supreme Court as “the recognition which one nation allows 
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another 
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, 
and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the 
protection of its laws”.54 
22 An anti-suit injunction by nature raises concerns of comity. It 
seeks to prevent a plaintiff from commencing proceedings in a foreign 
court through the threat of contempt of court in the local forum. It is 
                                                          
48 Orchard Capital I Ltd v Ravindra Kumar Jhunjhunwala [2012] 2 SLR 519  
at [26]–[29]. 
49 Cameron Sim, “Choice of Law and Anti-Suit Injunctions” (2013) 62 ICLQ 703 
at 705–706. 
50 Continental Bank v Aeakos Compania Naviera SA [1994] 1 WLR 588; Sohio v Gatoil 
[1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 588 at 592; Daniel Tan, “Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Vexing 
Problem of Comity (2004–2005) 45 Virginia Journal of International Law 283 
at 332–333. 
51 See paras 25–58 below. 
52 Samtani Anil, “Coming to Grips with Comity’s Grip on Anti-Suit Injunctions: 
Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel and Ors” (1998) 22 Asia Business Law Review 72 at 76; 
Steven R Swanson, “The Vexatiousness of a Vexation Rule: International Comity 
and Anti-Suit Injunctions” (1996–1997) 30 George Washington Journal of 
International Law & Economics 1 at 4. 
53 [1895] 159 US 113. 
54 Hilton v Guyot [1895] 159 US 113 at 163–164. 
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sometimes argued that an anti-suit injunction is not antithetical to comity 
because it operates in personam and does not interfere with foreign court 
procedure. However, commentators widely acknowledge that anti-suit 
injunctions nevertheless involve an indirect interference with the 
proceedings of a foreign court – when a local court bars a plaintiff from 
bringing proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction, the local court in effect has 
decided whether the foreign court is going to hear the case.55 Concerns of 
comity have risen to the fore in Europe with the advent of the Brussels 
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters 1968. The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) 
has frowned upon the use of anti-suit injunctions, overturning an  
anti-suit injunction granted by an English court in Turner v Grovit.56 The 
ECJ held that anti-suit injunctions demonstrate a lack of trust in the 
foreign court, conflict with the Brussels Convention’s goal of legal 
harmonisation, and amount to improper interference with the foreign 
court’s jurisdiction.57 
23 In recognition of the importance of comity, many jurisdictions 
require the forum to be the natural forum as a prerequisite for the grant 
of an anti-suit injunction.58 Lord Goff in Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel59 
articulated this requirement as part of an overarching requirement that 
the forum must have “a sufficient interest in, or connection with, the 
matter in question” in order to justify the grant of an anti-suit injunction 
against proceedings in a foreign court.60 The Canadian courts have gone 
even further to enshrine comity in their test for the grant of an anti-suit 
injunction. The first step of the Canadian test applies forum non 
conveniens principles, as do the English and Singaporean tests, but the 
difference is the perspective the Canadian courts take. In applying forum 
non conveniens principles, the Canadian courts will take the foreign 
court’s perspective to see if it could “reasonably have concluded that there 
was no alternative forum that was clearly more appropriate”.61 If the 
                                                          
55 Trevor C Hartley, “Comity and the Use of Anti-suit Injunctions in International 
Litigation” (1987) 35(3) American Journal of Comparative Law 487 at 506; Justice 
Hugh Williams, “Anti-Suit Injunctions: Damp Squib or Another Shot in the 
Maritime Locker? Reflections on Turner v Grovit” (2006) 20 Australian and New 
Zealand Maritime Law Journal 4 at 13; Dicey and Morris on The Conflict of Laws 
(Lawrence Collins gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 13th Ed, 2000) at p 386. 
56 [2004] Lloyd’s Rep 169. 
57 Turner v Grovit [2004] Lloyd’s Rep 169 at 172–173. 
58 Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871 at 896; 
Evergreen International SA v Volkswagen Group Singapore Pte Ltd [2004] 
2 SLR(R) 457 at [16]. 
59 [1999] 1 AC 119. 
60 Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119 at 138. 
61 Amchem Products Inc v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) [1993] 
150 NR 321 at 358–359; J P McEvoy, “International Litigation: Canada, Forum Non 
Conveniens and the Anti-Suit Injunction” (1995) 17(1) Advocates’ Quarterly 1  
at 14–15. 
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foreign court would have concluded thus, either through the application 
of forum non conveniens or other similar principles, the foreign court’s 
decision will be respected and the application for an anti-suit injunction 
will be dismissed.62 
24 An overemphasis on comity has been criticised by commentators 
who argue that the courts should be cognisant of their main role as 
dispensers of justice and should not defer too much to comity.63 Although 
this issue is not the subject under consideration in this article, this author 
is inclined to agree that equity should take priority over considerations of 
comity. Even as the courts should remain aware of the boundaries set by 
comity, the courts should also be cautious of “conflating the requirements 
for an injunction with its limiting factors”.64 It is worth noting that the 
courts have recognised a different balance between comity and equity in 
situations where there is a breach of an agreement. Where there is such a 
breach, both the English and Singapore courts have held that comity will 
take a backseat, provided that the local forum is the chosen forum.65 In 
such situations, the courts will be inclined towards upholding the 
agreement, granting an anti-suit injunction if necessary to do so. 
III. Contemporary Singapore cases 
25 This section will consider four Singaporean cases on anti-suit 
injunctions, with a view to elucidating the position in Singapore law 
regarding the relationship between the categories of breach of agreement 
and vexatious, oppressive or unconscionable conduct. 
                                                          
62 J P McEvoy, “International Litigation: Canada, Forum Non Conveniens and the  
Anti-Suit Injunction” (1995) 17(1) Advocates’ Quarterly 1 at 15. 
63 Samtani Anil, “Coming to Grips with Comity’s Grip on Anti-Suit Injunctions: 
Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel and Ors” (1998) 22 Asia Business Law Review 72 at 76. 
64 Daniel Tan, “Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Vexing Problem of Comity (2004–2005) 
45 Virginia Journal of International Law 283 at 309. The author in this article 
advocated caution against a trend in US law to place comity at the substantive centre 
of analysis. 
65 The Angelic Grace [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87 at 96; WSG Nimbus Pte Ltd v Board of 
Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka [2002] 1 SLR(R) 1088; Yeo Tiong Min, “Party 
Autonomy in International Civil Litigation: Singapore Law”, Centre for Legal 
Dynamics of Advanced Market Societies Discussion Paper 04/11E (2004) at paras 34 
and 35. The requirement to be a chosen forum is particularly relevant in Singapore, 
because the Singapore Court of Appeal has refused to uphold a jurisdiction 
agreement in favour of a third country, despite the existence of a breach of 
agreement. The Court of Appeal held that it did not want to act as “an international 
busybody”: see People’s Insurance Co Ltd v Akai Pty Ltd [1997] 2 SLR(R) 291 at [12]. 
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A. Kirkham v Trane 
26 In John Reginald Stott Kirkham v Trane US Inc66 (“Kirkham v 
Trane”), the appellants and respondents entered into a dispute regarding 
a distributorship agreement governing the distribution of American air 
conditioning systems and services in Indonesia. According to the 
respondents, they terminated the distributor arrangement when they 
discovered that one of the appellants had been distributing a direct 
competitor’s products. The appellants denied this allegation and 
commenced proceedings in Indonesia based on rights in Indonesian law 
arising out of its distributorship in Indonesia. Four months later, the 
respondents commenced an action in the High Court of Singapore 
seeking, inter alia, an anti-suit injunction to restrain the appellants from 
continuing proceedings in Indonesia. The High Court granted the  
anti-suit injunction, holding that the natural forum was Singapore and 
the continuation of the Indonesian proceedings was vexatious and 
oppressive. The appellants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal. 
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding, inter alia, that the 
continuation of the Indonesian proceedings was not vexatious and 
oppressive, since the Indonesian action was based on Indonesian tort law 
and there would be no conflict in decisions. Further, there was no 
presumption that a multiplicity of proceedings was vexatious. 
27 In coming to this conclusion, the Court of Appeal cited and 
approved the elements of the test set out in Evergreen International SA, 
originally formulated in Société Nationale,67 to determine whether an 
anti-suit injunction ought to be granted. The elements are: (a) whether 
the defendants are amenable to the jurisdiction of the Singapore court; 
(b) the natural forum for resolution of the dispute between the parties; 
(c) alleged vexation or oppression to the plaintiffs if the foreign 
proceedings are to continue; and (d) alleged injustice to the defendants as 
an injunction would deprive them of the advantages sought in the foreign 
proceedings.68 
28 Notably, the Court of Appeal made an addition to the Evergreen 
International SA test: whether the institution of foreign proceedings is in 
breach of any agreement between the parties. The Court of Appeal held 
that where such an agreement existed, the court may not feel diffident 
about granting an anti-suit injunction as it would only be enforcing a 
contractual promise and the question of international comity is not as 
relevant.69 However, in the case at hand, the Court of Appeal did not have 
                                                          
66 [2009] 4 SLR(R) 428. 
67 Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871 at 892–893. 
68 John Reginald Stott Kirkham v Trane US Inc [2009] 4 SLR(R) 428 at [28]. 
69 John Reginald Stott Kirkham v Trane US Inc [2009] 4 SLR(R) 428 at [29]. 
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to consider this additional element as there was no such agreement 
between the parties. 
29 It is noteworthy that the Court of Appeal in this case cited breach 
of an agreement as a factor to be considered as part of the court’s 
discretion to grant an anti-suit injunction. However, the role of this factor 
remained uncertain. Would it function as an independent ground 
justifying the grant of an anti-suit injunction, or would it merely serve as 
strong evidence of vexatious and oppressive conduct? The Court of 
Appeal’s reasoning suggested the latter.70 When considering the element 
of vexatious or oppressive conduct, the Court of Appeal cited with 
approval from Evergreen International SA:71 
… an assessment or evaluation of the conduct complained of and the 
nature of the plaintiff ’s rights or interests that are being infringed or 
threatened is needed. [emphasis added] 
30 If consideration of the plaintiff ’s rights and interests falls under 
the element of vexatious or oppressive conduct, that would mean that a 
consideration of the plaintiff ’s contractual rights under an agreement 
could potentially fall under the umbrella of the third element in the 
Kirkham v Trane test as well. However, there was no further clarification 
of the exact role of the new fifth factor, causing the boundaries between 
the two categories to remain uncertain following this judgment. 
B. Ashlock v SetClear 
31 The next case to apply the Kirkham v Trane test was Ashlock v 
SetClear. The appellant was an employee of the respondent. The appellant 
subsequently had disagreements with the respondent and ceased his 
employment with the respondent, signing a severance agreement which 
provided for “full and final settlement of all claims” against the 
respondent and its affiliated companies. However, the appellant later 
commenced proceedings in the New York courts. A year later, the 
respondent commenced proceedings in the Singapore courts seeking, 
inter alia, a declaration that the appellant was in breach of his severance 
agreement by commencing proceedings in New York, and an order 
restraining the appellant from continuing or commencing proceedings 
related to this matter. The High Court agreed that the severance 
agreement barred further claims between the parties and therefore 
granted an anti-suit injunction restraining the appellant from continuing 
proceedings in New York. The appellants appealed to the Court of 
Appeal, arguing that the High Court should have first considered the 
                                                          
70 John Reginald Stott Kirkham v Trane US Inc [2009] 4 SLR(R) 428 at [46]–[52]. 
71 John Reginald Stott Kirkham v Trane US Inc [2009] 4 SLR(R) 428 at [47]; Evergreen 
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applicable conflict of laws principles as they relate to interlocutory  
anti-suit injunctions before determining the case on its merits. The Court 
of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding, inter alia, that the case at hand 
did not involve an interlocutory application for an anti-suit injunction, 
but rather a permanent injunction resulting from a judgment on the 
merits. Therefore, the High Court was correct in making a determination 
of the merits of the case first. 
32 While considering whether the anti-suit injunction should be 
granted, the Court of Appeal held that the principles governing the grant 
of permanent injunctions are similar to the principles governing 
interlocutory injunctions on the ground that foreign proceedings are in 
breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement, citing National 
Westminster Bank v Utrecht-America Finance72 (“National Westminster 
Bank”).73 The Court of Appeal also agreed that the court should readily 
grant anti-suit injunctions in such situations, in line with The Angelic 
Grace74 and Kirkham v Trane.75 In addition, the Court of Appeal accepted 
the Kirkham v Trane guidelines with regard to the grant of interlocutory 
anti-suit injunctions.76 
33 It is clear that the Court of Appeal recognised a difference in 
reasoning between cases where an anti-suit injunction is sought in breach 
of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement and cases without such a breach. 
However, even with regard to cases involving a breach of an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement, the Court of Appeal approved the usage of the 
language of vexatious and oppressive conduct as the justification for the 
grant of an anti-suit injunction. In determining the principles to apply to 
cases where there was a breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement, the 
Court of Appeal cited National Westminster Bank:77 
Thus it would be vexatious to allow Utrecht to continue its breach in 
circumstances where damages would not be an adequate remedy …. 
[emphasis added] 
                                                          
72 [2001] CLC 1372. 
73 Ashlock William Grover v SetClear Pte Ltd [2012] 2 SLR 625 at [35]; National 
Westminster Bank v Utrecht-America Finance [2001] CLC 1372 at [29]–[35]. 
74 Ashlock William Grover v SetClear Pte Ltd [2012] 2 SLR 625 at [35]; The Angelic 
Grace [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87 at 96 (CA). 
75 Ashlock William Grover v SetClear Pte Ltd [2012] 2 SLR 625 at [37]; John Reginald 
Stott Kirkham v Trane US Inc [2009] 4 SLR(R) 428 at [29]. 
76 Ashlock William Grover v SetClear Pte Ltd [2012] 2 SLR 625 at [37]. 
77 Ashlock William Grover v SetClear Pte Ltd [2012] 2 SLR 625 at [35]; National 
Westminster Bank v Utrecht-America Finance [2001] CLC 1372 at [35]. 
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34 The Court of Appeal also affirmed78 the reasoning in Continental 
Bank NA v Aeakos Compania Naviera SA79 that was cited in The Angelic 
Grace:80 
[I]n our judgment the continuance of Greek proceedings amounts to 
vexatious and oppressive conduct on the part of the defendants. 
[emphasis added] 
35 These statements would appear to be support for the proposition 
that breach of an agreement is relevant to the grant of an anti-suit 
injunction only in so far as it is evidence of vexatious and oppressive 
conduct. However, the reasoning of the Court of Appeal elsewhere in the 
judgment suggests that the test for the grant of an anti-suit injunction 
where there is a breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement is wholly 
separate from the Kirkham v Trane test. This is because the court analysed 
the case before it by first citing authority that the test for the grant of a 
permanent anti-suit injunction is the same as that for the grant of an 
interlocutory anti-suit injunction where there is breach of an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement, and then going on to consider that even if the 
Kirkham v Trane test applied, the result would have been the same. The 
court made no mention of the Kirkham v Trane test in its consideration 
of the principles applying to interlocutory anti-suit injunctions being 
sought on the ground of breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. 
This implied that the Kirkham v Trane test applies only to cases where 
there is no breach of an agreement. The court appeared to envision the 
Kirkham v Trane test as applying to anti-suit injunctions generally, and an 
entirely different test applying where there is breach of an agreement. 
36 Overall, although parts of the judgment support the proposition 
that breach of an agreement is merely evidence of vexatious and 
oppressive conduct, other sections of the judgment imply a separation of 
the two categories to the extent that they are not even part of the same 
test. Therefore, in the wake of the judgment in Ashlock v SetClear, the 
boundaries between the two categories remained unclear. 
C. UBS v Telesto Investments 
37 The next opportunity for the issue to be considered arose in the 
Singapore High Court case of UBS AG v Telesto Investments Ltd81 (“UBS v 
Telesto Investments”). 
38 The defendants, Telesto Investments, opened an account with the 
plaintiff, UBS AG (Singapore). The plaintiff extended credit facilities to 
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the defendants, with the second defendant acting as guarantor. The 
account, facilities and guarantee were governed by Singapore law and 
contained non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses in favour of Singapore. 
Subsequently, the account suffered a margin shortfall, entitling the 
plaintiff to liquidate the collateral. The defendants and plaintiff entered 
into a standstill agreement, under which the defendants would provide, 
inter alia, a share deposit and letter of undertaking from a separate unit 
trust, in exchange for the plaintiff not liquidating the collateral. 
39 However, the defendants failed to fulfil their obligations under 
the standstill agreement, leading the plaintiff to furnish a notice of 
termination of the agreement to the defendants. The plaintiff also 
commenced proceedings in Singapore to recover the liabilities owed 
under the account agreement. Shortly after, the defendants commenced 
proceedings in Australia against UBS AG’s branch in Australia, arguing 
that their investments were made as a result of misrepresentations and 
seeking an order that all the agreements with the plaintiff were void 
ab initio. The plaintiff filed an application for an anti-suit injunction 
against the defendants in respect of the Australian proceedings. The 
defendants also filed to stay the Singapore proceedings in favour of the 
Australian proceedings. The assistant registrar dismissed the stay 
applications and granted an anti-suit injunction against the defendants 
from continuing the Australian proceedings.82 The defendants appealed 
the dismissal of their stay applications and the grant of the anti-suit 
injunction to the Singapore High Court. 
40 In its judgment, the Singapore High Court affirmed the 
Kirkham v Trane test for the grant of an anti-suit injunction.83 Notably, 
the court declared that breach of an agreement is an independent ground 
for the grant of an anti-suit injunction:84 
This ground is founded on a contractual right and is a separate inquiry 
distinct from the requirement of vexatious or oppressive conduct. 
41 Taken on its own, this statement would appear to have settled the 
issue of the boundaries between the two categories. This statement is 
further supported by the High Court’s citation of the following passage 
from Deutsche Bank AG v Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP85 
(“Deutsche Bank”) with approval, in the context of a discussion of the 
principle to be drawn from Sabah Shipyard:86 
                                                          
82 UBS AG v Telesto Investments Ltd [2011] 4 SLR 503 at [44]–[46]. 
83 UBS AG v Telesto Investments Ltd [2011] 4 SLR 503 at [108]. 
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85 [2010] 1 WLR 1023. 
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The decision is best understood to have been based on the finding that 
the GOP acted in breach of its contract with Sabah by bringing 
proceedings in Islamabad in which it claimed an injunction to prevent 
Sabah from enforcing its rights against GOP in England pursuant to the 
English non-exclusive jurisdiction clause … If I am wrong, and the 
injunction was granted not in support of a legal right but under the 
court’s power to protect Sabah from vexatious and oppressive litigation, 
the conduct of the GOP was certainly vexatious and oppressive on the 
particular facts of the case. 
42 It is clear from this passage that the English Court of Appeal 
understood breach of an agreement and vexatious and oppressive 
conduct as separate grounds for the grant of an anti-suit injunction, and 
the Singapore High Court’s citation of such reasoning suggests its 
approval of this clear distinction. 
43 However, the Singapore High Court’s reasoning later in the 
judgment, especially with regard to Sabah Shipyard, introduced 
ambiguity into Singapore law. 
44 The Singapore High Court had to determine whether there was 
a breach of a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of Singapore by 
Telesto Investments. An argument raised by the plaintiff was that Sabah 
Shipyard stood for the general proposition that where a non-exclusive 
jurisdiction clause applies, the court may infer an intention on the part of 
the contracting parties not to bring or continue parallel proceedings in 
foreign countries after an action had been commenced in the primary 
forum stated in the non-exclusive jurisdiction clause.87 If such an 
intention could be inferred into the non-exclusive jurisdiction clause, 
Telesto Investments would be in breach of the clause, with consequent 
implications for the grant of an anti-suit injunction. 
45 A description of the facts and holding in Sabah Shipyard will be 
appropriate at this point. Sabah Shipyard concerned a set of agreements 
between the Government of Pakistan (“GOP”), KESC, a state-owned 
corporation, and Sabah Shipyard (Pakistan) Pte Ltd (“Sabah Shipyard”) 
relating to the design, construction and maintenance of an electric 
generation facility in Karachi. GOP entered into a guarantee in favour of 
Sabah Shipyard under which it guaranteed the obligations of KESC under 
one of the agreements. Clause 1.91 of the guarantee stated:88 
Each Party consents to the jurisdiction of the Courts of England for any 
action filed by the other Party under this agreement to resolve any 
dispute between the Parties and may be enforced in England …. 
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46 Disputes subsequently arose and an arbitration was held in 
Singapore. This resulted in an award in Sabah Shipyard’s favour. Sabah 
Shipyard demanded payment from KESC, but KESC denied liability. 
Sabah Shipyard then claimed under its guarantee against GOP. In 
response, GOP commenced proceedings in Islamabad for a declaration 
that it was not bound by the arbitration between KESC and Sabah 
Shipyard and that the guarantee was invalid due to a failure of 
consideration. Crucially, GOP sought an injunction against Sabah 
Shipyard to prevent it from making any demand under the guarantee. 
Sabah Shipyard sought an anti-suit injunction from the English courts 
against the proceedings in Islamabad. David Steel J granted the anti-suit 
injunction. GOP appealed, but Steel J’s decision was upheld by the English 
Court of Appeal. 
47 The English Court of Appeal first found that on a construction 
of the jurisdiction clause and the rest of the contract in question, it cannot 
have been the intention of the parties that if proceedings were 
commenced in England, parallel proceedings could be pursued elsewhere 
unless there was some exceptional reason for doing so. Thus, there was a 
breach of the jurisdiction agreement by GOP in seeking to prevent Sabah 
Shipyard from commencing proceedings in the agreed jurisdiction. The 
court in Sabah Shipyard then went on to consider whether an anti-suit 
injunction should be granted against the proceedings in Pakistan. The 
English Court of Appeal concluded that the conduct of GOP was 
vexatious and oppressive in the context of the intention of the parties as 
“it simply cannot have been contemplated that if proceedings were 
commenced in the forum each had agreed as convenient, parallel 
proceedings would still take place in Pakistan”.89 
48 Returning to the case before it, the Singapore High Court held 
that Sabah Shipyard did not stand for the general proposition argued for 
by the plaintiff.90 The High Court quoted Cheshire, North & Fawcett91 in 
support of its reasoning:92 
Where the agreement provides for the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the 
English courts there is no breach of agreement in bringing proceedings 
abroad and therefore an injunction will not be granted on the basis  
of breach of an agreement. However, if one party (A) by way of a  
pre-emptive strike seeks an injunction abroad whereby the other  
party (B) will be permanently restrained from making any demand 
under a contract (containing a non-exclusive English jurisdiction 
                                                          
89 Sabah Shipyard (Pakistan) Ltd v Islamic Republic of Pakistan [2003] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 571 at [42]. 
90 UBS AG v Telesto Investments Ltd [2011] 4 SLR 503 at [125]. 
91 J Fawcett & J M Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law 
(P North consultant ed) (Oxford University Press, 14th Ed, 2008). 
92 J Fawcett & J M Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law 
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clause) in the hope of preventing B from starting proceedings in 
England, this is a breach of contract and vexatious. An injunction 
restraining A from continuing the proceedings abroad will then be 
granted on the basis of vexation or oppression. [emphasis added] 
49 The Singapore High Court subsequently concluded that the  
anti-suit injunction in respect of the Islamabad proceedings in Sabah 
Shipyard was granted on the ground that the proceedings were vexatious 
and oppressive as opposed to the drawing of an inference that the parties 
had intended that no parallel proceedings be commenced upon agreeing 
to a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause.93 The Singapore High Court added 
that in any case, the breach of contract in Sabah Shipyard was not the 
breach of the non-exclusive jurisdiction clause, but the breach of contract 
in commencing proceedings to prevent Sabah Shipyard from enforcing 
its rights under the contract.94 In the case before it, the Singapore High 
Court found that the anti-suit injunction could be granted on the basis of 
the court’s power to restrain vexatious or oppressive conduct. 
50 It is respectfully submitted that the Singapore High Court’s 
interpretation of Sabah Shipyard requires reconsideration. In the 
paragraph from Cheshire, North & Fawcett quoted by the High Court, the 
learned authors describe how a party may breach a non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement by seeking an injunction abroad in the hope of 
preventing the other party from starting proceedings in the chosen 
forum. It appears that the High Court interpreted the passage as 
describing a breach of contract separate from the breach of the  
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement. This led to the Singapore High 
Court’s conclusion that the breach of contract in Sabah Shipyard was not 
related to the non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement. However, the breach 
of contract described in the passage in Cheshire, North & Fawcett must 
have stemmed from the non-exclusive jurisdiction clause. Since the  
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement conveyed an agreement to bring 
proceedings in England, the act of seeking an injunction against the 
commencement of proceedings in England could amount to a breach of 
the non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement. If the non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement had not been present in the contract, there would 
have been no breach of contract. 
51 Therefore, the Singapore High Court correctly identified a 
breach of contract in Sabah Shipyard, but did not properly attribute this 
breach of contract to the non-exclusive jurisdiction clause. The Singapore 
High Court’s holding can possibly be attributed to an unwillingness to 
read too much into a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement, due to a 
desire to avoid blurring the lines between non-exclusive and exclusive 
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jurisdiction agreements. Such an attitude is justifiable – blurred lines 
between the two types of jurisdiction agreements may have an impact on 
commercial certainty, especially when parties are doing forward planning 
via contract. 
52 However, the conclusion to draw from this case is now 
ambiguous. It depends on one’s view of the type of breach of contract that 
occurred in Sabah Shipyard. There are two possibilities. If the breach is 
viewed as a breach of contract unrelated to the jurisdiction agreement, 
then the High Court’s interpretation of the anti-suit injunction in Sabah 
Shipyard as having been granted under the ground of vexatious and 
oppressive conduct is unobjectionable. 
53 On the other hand, if the breach is viewed as a breach of the  
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement, as should be the case, then the 
Singapore High Court was implicitly approving the proposition that 
breach of a jurisdiction agreement is merely evidence of vexatious or 
oppressive conduct. This is because the Singapore High Court concluded 
that the anti-suit injunction in Sabah Shipyard was granted on the ground 
of vexatious and oppressive conduct. Given that there was no other reason 
offered to support the finding of vexatious and oppressive conduct, aside 
from the breach, the finding of vexatious and oppressive conduct must 
have been based on the breach of the jurisdiction agreement. 
54 In sum, the Singapore High Court in UBS v Telesto Investments 
did not bring any resolution to the boundaries between the two 
categories. The conclusion to be drawn from the Singapore High Court’s 
analysis of Sabah Shipyard in UBS v Telesto Investments also remains 
uncertain. 
D. Morgan Stanley 
55 In Morgan Stanley Asia (Singapore) Pte v Hong Leong Finance 
Ltd95 (“Morgan Stanley”), the contract between the parties contained a 
non-exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of Singapore. The clause 
read:96 
This Agreement is governed by and shall be construed in accordance 
with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. The parties hereto submit to 
the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Singapore. 
56 In this case, the plaintiffs were pursuing an anti-suit injunction 
against proceedings started by the defendant in New York. As the High 
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Court considered whether to exercise its power to grant the anti-suit 
injunction, the court affirmed the Kirkham v Trane test.97 As a guide to 
applying the test, the High Court added:98 
At the outset, I should mention that [the Kirkham v Trane factors] are 
not independent of each other, and the authorities cited above have 
stressed the importance of looking at all the factors in the round. 
[emphasis added] 
57 The High Court noted that in arguing for the anti-suit injunction 
to be granted, the plaintiffs did not argue that there was a breach of the 
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement. Instead, in the context of the 
Kirkham v Trane test, the plaintiffs relied on the existence of the  
non-exclusive jurisdiction clause as a very strong indicator in a natural 
forum analysis.99 To determine the strength of this indicator, the High 
Court cited the Court of Appeal judgment in Orchard Capital, which held 
that “the weight to be attributed to it ought to depend on the 
circumstances”.100 The plaintiffs ultimately failed to show that Singapore 
was the natural forum, and the High Court eventually refused to grant 
the anti-suit injunction for reasons of expediency and a lack of vexatious 
and oppressive conduct. 
58 In this case, the High Court considered the existence of the  
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement only as part of the natural forum 
element in the Kirkham v Trane test. However, this case is noteworthy in 
the context of the issue being considered in this article because the High 
Court expressly stated that the factors in the Kirkham v Trane test “are not 
independent of each other”.101 Unfortunately, by itself, this statement does 
little to clarify the issue at hand – did the High Court mean that breach 
of an agreement in itself would not be sufficient to allow the grant of an 
anti-suit injunction, potentially requiring proof of vexatious and 
oppressive conduct above and beyond the breach of agreement, or did the 
High Court mean that breach of an agreement is an independent ground 
for the grant of an anti-suit injunction in so far as it does not require 
further proof of vexatious and oppressive conduct, but that it remains part 
of a holistic test aimed at serving the ends of justice? Both alternatives 
remain plausible in the wake of the High Court’s decision. 
                                                          
97 Morgan Stanley Asia (Singapore) Pte v Hong Leong Finance Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 409 at [26]. 
98 Morgan Stanley Asia (Singapore) Pte v Hong Leong Finance Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 409 at [26]. 
99 Morgan Stanley Asia (Singapore) Pte v Hong Leong Finance Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 409 at [56]. 
100 Orchard Capital I Ltd v Ravindra Kumar Jhunjhunwala [2012] 2 SLR 519 at [30], 
citing Yeo Tiong Min, “The Contractual Basis of the Enforcement of Exclusive and 
Non-Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements” (2005) 17 SAcLJ 306 at 349, para 88. 
101 Morgan Stanley Asia (Singapore) Pte v Hong Leong Finance Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 409 at [26]. 
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IV. Three possible approaches: Reflections 
59 As can be seen from the preceding analysis of contemporary 
Singapore case law, the Singapore courts have not been consistent with 
regard to the relationship between the categories of vexatious, oppressive 
or unconscionable conduct and breach of agreement. Even in a single 
judgment, one can find conflicting indicators as to whether breach of 
agreement is an independent ground for the grant of an anti-suit 
injunction or serves as evidence of vexatious and oppressive conduct. The 
boundaries between the two categories of cases are not clear. 
60 The cases reviewed above present three possible alternatives for 
the formulation of the boundaries between the two categories. 
61 First, breach of an agreement could be viewed as an independent 
ground for the grant of an anti-suit injunction in so far as it is not merely 
evidence of vexatious and oppressive conduct but is a ground in itself for 
an award of an anti-suit injunction. Vexatious and oppressive conduct 
need not be further proven as long as there is a breach of an agreement. 
On this view, breach of an agreement and vexatious, oppressive and 
unconscionable conduct would be distinct categories for the grant of an 
anti-suit injunction. However, both categories would be analysed under 
the Kirkham v Trane test, both serving as elements in an equitable analysis 
aimed at pursuing the ends of justice in each case, but differing in kind. 
62 Second, breach of an agreement could be viewed as evidence of 
vexatious and oppressive conduct. Viewed thus, breach of an agreement 
would not be an independent ground for the grant of an anti-suit 
injunction – proof of additional vexatious and oppressive conduct may be 
required, although the breach would be a strong indicator of vexatious or 
oppressive conduct in itself. On this view, the borders between the two 
categories are blurred. The two categories will also be analysed under the 
Kirkham v Trane test to achieve the ends of justice. However, in contrast 
to the first approach, the difference between the two categories would be 
a matter of degree, rather than kind. 
63 Third, breach of an agreement could be seen as requiring an 
analysis entirely independent of the Kirkham v Trane test. As long as there 
is a breach of an agreement, the court’s concern will be to uphold the 
parties’ bargain. The Kirkham v Trane equitable analysis would only apply 
where there is no such breach. This approach was implied by the court in 
Ashlock v SetClear. 
64 All three approaches are possible under the existing case law, 
despite the fact that all three lead to differing consequences in the test for 
the grant of an anti-suit injunction. It is suggested that this ambiguity in 
the existing case law is undesirable, and that clarity regarding the 
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boundaries between the two categories is very important. Clarity in the 
formulation of the boundaries reflects clarity in the jurisprudential basis 
of anti-suit injunctions, which is crucial to giving the law a good 
foundation in principle and allowing the law to develop in a coherent 
manner.102 The question thus is which approach to formulating the 
boundaries between the two categories should be taken. 
A. Comparing the first and second approaches 
65 Both approaches are founded upon an overarching concern that 
the ends of justice are met, in recognition of the jurisprudential roots of 
anti-suit injunctions in equity. The difference between the approaches lies 
in the nature of the relationship between the two categories. 
66 Between these two approaches, it is suggested that the first is 
preferable. The tendency to blur the boundaries between the two 
categories can be attributed to their common roots in the court’s equitable 
jurisdiction. Both categories are indeed elements in an equitable analysis, 
and involve an exercise of the court’s equitable jurisdiction, as mentioned 
above. It thus becomes tempting to conflate the two categories together 
in an analysis of the equities of the case. However, authority and first 
principles lean in the direction of a distinction in kind, rather than degree, 
between the two categories. 
67 First, there is strong authority for the first approach. There are 
numerous English and Singaporean cases that have drawn a clear 
distinction between the two categories and recognised the differing 
analysis triggered by each category.103 Australian law distinguishes clearly 
between the two categories as well. In Ace Insurance,104 Brereton J held 
that his conclusion on the breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the 
case relieved him of the necessity of considering whether the 
commencement of foreign proceedings was vexatious and oppressive, 
thus implying that the two categories are separate and distinct grounds 
for the grant of an anti-suit injunction. 
68 Second, the two categories can be clearly distinguished in 
principle. In both categories, the basis for the grant of the anti-suit 
injunction is the personal equity between the parties. However, 
a distinction can still be drawn between the type of equity being acted 
                                                          
102 Cameron Sim, “Choice of Law and Anti-Suit Injunctions” (2013) 62 ICLQ 703 at 708. 
103 WSG Nimbus Pte Ltd v Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka [2002] 
1 SLR(R) 1088 at [91]; The Asian Plutus [1990] 1 SLR(R) 504; Turner v Grovit [2002] 
1 WLR 107 at [27]; The Angelic Grace [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87 at 96; Donohue v 
Armco Inc [2001] UKHL 64; [2002] 1 All ER 749 at [24]; The Eleftheria [1970] P 94 
at 99–100. 
104 Ace Insurance Ltd v Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 724 at [73]. 
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upon in each category. The equity involved in the category of breach of 
agreement is grounded in the personal equities generated by the 
agreement between the parties.105 In contrast, the equity involved in the 
category of vexatious, oppressive and unconscionable conduct is based on 
the personal equities arising from the conduct of the parties towards each 
other.106 In addition, breach of an agreement introduces the additional 
policy concern of maintaining commercial certainty by giving effect to 
parties’ agreements.107 Therefore, it is clear that cases involving a breach 
of an agreement stand on a different plane from cases involving vexatious, 
oppressive and unconscionable conduct. 
69 Third, adopting the second approach could lead to conceptual 
asymmetry, in the light of the law’s special treatment of exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements. As mentioned above, the law imposes a strong 
reasons requirement on the party in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement to explain why the breach should be allowed. If the second 
approach is adopted, with the two categories differing in degree and not 
in kind, then the justification for the strong reasons requirement would 
be the degree of the vexatious and oppressive conduct evidenced by a 
breach of a jurisdiction agreement. This justification will lead to 
conceptual asymmetry between the strong reasons test in the context of 
the grant of an anti-suit injunction and stay of proceedings. Since there is 
no requirement to show vexatious or oppressive conduct in the context of 
a stay of proceedings, this justification for the strong reasons test can no 
longer apply to the same test in a stay of proceedings exercise. Such 
conceptual asymmetry is difficult to rationalise, since the strong reasons 
test applies in exactly the same fashion in both contexts. 
70 Fourth, leading on from the new justification for the strong 
reasons requirement necessitated by the second approach, the second 
approach would also open the door in theory for particularly vexatious 
and oppressive conduct to trigger a strong reasons requirement as well, 
even if there is no breach of a jurisdiction agreement. On the other end 
of the spectrum, it would also become valid in principle to argue that the 
strong reasons requirement may not be triggered even in the presence of 
a breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement, if the party in breach is 
                                                          
105 Yeo Tiong Min, “The Effective Reach of In Personam Reasoning in Private 
International Law” Yong Pung How Professorship of Law Lecture (2009) at para 16. 
106 Yeo Tiong Min, “The Effective Reach of In Personam Reasoning in Private 
International Law” Yong Pung How Professorship of Law Lecture (2009) at para 16. 
107 Daniel Tan, “No Dispute Amounting to Strong Cause; Strong Cause for Dispute?” 
(2001) 13 SAcLJ 428 at 435; Vincent Leow, “Exclusively Here to Stay: The Applicable 
Principles to Granting a Stay on the Basis of an Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause” (2004) 
Sing JLS 569 at 573; J Fawcett & P North, Cheshire and North’s Private International 
Law (Oxford University Press, 13th Ed, 1999) at p 350; Dicey and Morris on The 
Conflict of Laws (Lawrence Collins gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 13th Ed, 2000) 
at p 442. 
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able to show that the balance of the equities in the case is able to mitigate 
his breach of the agreement. This would lead to some practical 
difficulties. A confusing shift in the burden of proof will be required – for 
instance, should the plaintiff be able to prove vexatious, oppressive or 
unconscionable conduct beyond a certain threshold,108 he would be able 
to shift the burden of proof over to the defendant to show strong reasons 
why the anti-suit injunction should not be granted despite his vexatious 
conduct. Likewise, a defendant in breach of an agreement should be able 
to argue that he does not have to show strong reasons because the 
objective justice of the case mitigates his breach of agreement, thus 
shifting the burden of proof back to the plaintiff to prove the vexatious, 
oppressive or unconscionable conduct necessary for the grant of an anti-
suit injunction. These possibilities will certainly complicate proceedings 
and introduce considerable uncertainty as to the effect of jurisdiction 
agreements, yet are entirely possible in principle on the second approach. 
71 The first approach faces no such difficulties. Since the category 
of breach of an agreement is different in kind from the category of 
vexatious, oppressive or unconscionable conduct, there will be no 
conceptual asymmetry between the strong reasons test in the context of 
an anti-suit injunction and stay of proceedings exercise. The same 
underlying principles for the strong reasons test can apply equally to both 
contexts. Also, it stands to reason that a unique analysis, ie, the strong 
reasons test, can be properly applied to the first category alone and not 
the second. Thus, on the first approach, the practical difficulties 
highlighted above are not possible even in principle. Although the 
practical difficulties introduced by the second approach are not 
insurmountable, the question is whether they are necessary evils to be 
overcome or symptoms of a dysfunctional foundation in principle. 
B. Comparing the first and third approaches 
72 The third approach draws an even sharper distinction between 
the two categories. On this approach, the jurisprudential basis for the 
grant of an anti-suit injunction in each category would be different – for 
the category of vexatious, oppressive and unconscionable conduct, the 
jurisprudential basis remains equity and the jurisdiction exercised is 
equitable, while for the category of breach of agreement, the 
jurisprudential basis is sanctity of contract and the jurisdiction exercised 
is legal. Upholding the parties’ contractual agreement would thus be the 
rationale for the grant of the anti-suit injunction in the second category, 
rather than upholding the ends of justice. 
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73 The third approach avoids the difficulties arising from a 
conflation of the two categories, as will occur in the second approach. 
However, it would be difficult to reconcile this approach with the 
established jurisprudential basis of anti-suit injunctions. As mentioned 
previously, anti-suit injunctions are based on the court’s equitable or 
inherent jurisdiction. Adopting the third approach amounts to finding an 
entirely new jurisprudential basis for anti-suit injunctions, leading to 
considerable difficulty in rationalising this approach with the existing 
case law. For instance, this approach would mean that the fifth element 
set out by the Singapore Court of Appeal in Kirkham v Trane would 
become superfluous. Also, this approach would be at odds with the 
general consensus in English and Singapore law that the court’s power to 
grant anti-suit injunctions is discretionary – a characteristic of an exercise 
of equitable rather than legal jurisdiction.109 The “strong reasons” test, 
developed over decades of case law, would have to be discarded if the 
court’s jurisdiction to grant anti-suit injunctions is no longer 
discretionary. In addition, adopting this approach would leave no space 
for a consideration of comity as a constraining factor in the exercise of 
the court’s jurisdiction. In view of these issues, it is suggested that the 
third approach is not tenable unless the Singapore courts wish to 
undertake a complete revision of the law on anti-suit injunctions. 
V. Way ahead 
74 Between the three possible approaches to formulating the 
boundaries, this article argues that the first approach should be taken, and 
that the Singapore courts should clearly articulate so in their judgments. 
The first approach will provide a good jurisprudential basis for the law in 
this area – accounting for the law’s long-standing acceptance of upholding 
the parties’ bargain as a distinct principle in the context of the grant of 
anti-suit injunctions, providing a principled basis for the “strong reasons” 
test, and cohering with the substantial amount of authority in this area of 
law. Having a good foundation in principle for the applicable rules of law 
will allow the law to continue developing in a coherent manner. 
75 With the boundaries between the categories thus clarified, the 
test for the grant of an anti-suit injunction in Singapore would be as 
follows. Whether the ground relied upon is breach of agreement or 
vexatious, oppressive or unconscionable conduct, the Kirkham v Trane 
test will apply. The first factor, ie, whether the defendants are amenable to 
the jurisdiction of the Singapore court, is common to both types of cases 
and requires little explanation. 
                                                          
109 The Angelic Grace [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87 at 96; WSG Nimbus Pte Ltd v Board of 
Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka [2002] 1 SLR(R) 1088 at [85]. 
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76 The second factor, ie, the natural forum for resolution of the 
dispute between the parties, is also common to both types of cases. The 
general requirement is that the forum must be the natural forum for the 
resolution of the dispute before an anti-suit injunction will be granted to 
restrain foreign proceedings. Where there is a breach of a forum 
jurisdiction agreement, the jurisdiction agreement alone should provide 
a sufficient connection between the forum and the matter in question.110 
However, there are exceptions to this requirement. First, in a single forum 
situation, where the forum is asked to grant an anti-suit injunction against 
proceedings in a foreign court which alone has jurisdiction, the 
requirements of comity can still be met if the transactions between the 
parties are connected with the forum to a great extent, or if the policies of 
the forum must be protected.111 Second, there may be exceptional 
circumstances where the natural forum requirement can be overlooked 
to allow the grant of an anti-suit injunction, for example, “where the 
conduct of the foreign state exercising jurisdiction is such as to deprive it 
of the respect normally required by comity”.112 
77 The analysis diverges for the remaining three factors. The third 
and fourth factors, ie, alleged vexation or oppression to the plaintiffs and 
alleged injustice to the defendants, are the primary factors where the 
ground relied upon is vexatious, oppressive or unconscionable conduct. 
Where this is the ground relied upon, the applicant will have to prove that 
the ends of justice will be served by the grant of an anti-suit injunction, 
taking into account both the vexation and oppression to the applicant if 
the foreign proceedings were to continue, and the injustice suffered by 
the defendant if he is unable to follow through on the foreign 
proceedings. The fifth factor in the Kirkham v Trane test will not apply in 
this analysis. 
78 The fifth factor, ie, whether the institution of foreign proceedings 
is in breach of any agreement between the parties, will be the primary 
factor where the ground relied upon is breach of agreement. Where the 
agreement involved is a jurisdiction agreement, the courts should first 
classify the clause through contractual construction to determine if it is 
exclusive or non-exclusive in effect, taking into account the express 
wording of the clause and the overall factual matrix. If the effect of the 
jurisdiction agreement is exclusive, the court will next determine if there 
has been a breach falling within the scope of the agreement. Should a 
breach of the agreement be found, it will be sufficient on its own as a 
ground for the grant of an anti-suit injunction – there is no further 
                                                          
110 The Singapore courts are unlikely to grant an anti-suit injunction in favour of a 
foreign jurisdiction clause, in the light of the Court of Appeal’s holding that it would 
not want to act as “an international busybody”: see People’s Insurance Co Ltd v Akai 
Pty Ltd [1997] 2 SLR(R) 291 at [12]. 
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requirement to adduce evidence of vexatious, oppressive or 
unconscionable conduct. The strong reasons requirement will be 
triggered to shift the burden of proof over to the party in breach to justify 
the breach of agreement. This does not mean that there is no need to 
examine the overall justice of the situation in such a case – rather, such 
an analysis will now fall under the strong reasons test, and can have regard 
to the third and fourth factors in the Kirkham v Trane test as well. If the 
effect of the jurisdiction agreement is non-exclusive, then the ground 
relied upon for the grant of the anti-suit injunction will be vexatious, 
oppressive or unconscionable conduct. The analysis in the preceding 
paragraph will apply. However, the existence of the non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement will remain significant as one of the factors to 
determine the natural forum and how vexatious the defendant’s conduct 
is, and the strength of this factor will depend on the circumstances of 
the case. 
79 Where the agreement involved is a settlement agreement or 
choice of law clause, in principle, the breach of such agreements through 
the commencement of foreign proceedings can also be remedied by the 
grant of an anti-suit injunction. The principles applicable to an anti-suit 
injunction awarded on these grounds should be substantially the same as 
those applying to exclusive jurisdiction agreements. However, as noted in 
Part II,113 the authority to support the grant of anti-suit injunctions for 
breach of such agreements is not as extensive as that for the grant of  
anti-suit injunctions for breach of jurisdiction agreements. It remains to 
be seen how the Singapore courts will develop the law in this regard. 
VI. Conclusion 
80 This article has sought to elucidate the principles applicable to 
anti-suit injunctions, demonstrate that Singapore case law has been 
ambiguous regarding the boundaries between the categories of cases for 
the grant of anti-suit injunctions, argue that the boundaries must be made 
distinct, and offer a way ahead for the clarification of the boundaries 
between the two categories. 
81 The ambiguous boundaries between the categories of cases for 
the grant of an anti-suit injunction can be easily rectified with greater 
clarity about the principles underlying anti-suit injunctions. The 
ambiguity in the case law highlighted above is merely a symptom of this 
lack of clarity. It is hoped that the analysis offered in this article will serve 
as an aid to clarifying the law of anti-suit injunctions. 
 
                                                          
113 See paras 11–20 above. 
